Promised Rain.

The God That Learned the “I”

article thumbnail

EXCERPT

Examining the Enemy’s emergence through Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and Gotthard Günther’s cybernetic ontology, with particular attention to the “I,” the Other, recognition, and self-reference.

PUBLISHED

LAST EDITED

2026-10-08

Never.

TAGS

#Philosophy#Visual Novel#Analysis

ARTICLE

Warning

Spoilers for all of Saihate no Ima.

Abstract

Originally, this was mostly spurred on because of a discussion I had with some individuals regarding the Enemy’s nature. That discussion led me to examine the Enemy in Saihate no Ima a bit more in-depth, focusing on its emergence from the Imaginary Network and the circumstances surrounding its eventual awakening. I mainly approach the Enemy through two related philosophical perspectives: Gotthard Günther’s essay “Cybernetic Ontology and Transjunctional Operations,” particularly his distinction between consciousness, self-reference, and the logical structures required for genuine subjectivity, and Hegel’s account of self-consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit, particularly the relation between the “I” and the Other, and the role of recognition. My central thesis is that the Enemy emerges as an immensely complex, self-organizing consciousness through the total integration of human consciousness while initially lacking the differentiated self-reference necessary for genuine subjectivity, with Shinobu’s confrontation introducing the otherness and loss through which the Enemy can develop an “I.”

The Ignorant “God”

The Imaginary Network (IN) is a higher-order communication network created by connecting human consciousnesses through ミーム [mīmu / memes], artificially designed microorganisms that spread through the environment and form neural bypasses between individuals (the concept draws upon Richard Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene). Humans connected in this way become “terminals,” capable of receiving and transmitting information through the network, with more advanced terminals developing increasingly powerful consciousnesses to participate in a distributed system whose processing capacity vastly exceeds that of any single individual. At its highest level, the IN can be centrally administered through a “King” unit (i.e., Shinobu), allowing the processing power of the network as a whole to be brought under a single authority.

From this network, the Enemy emerges as a consciousness formed through the large-scale integration of countless human minds. As Shinobu realizes: (イマジナリー・ネットによってユニオナイズされた無数の人の意識 […] そこからさらに創発によって生まれた超自我が […] 敵) [The consciousness of countless people unified by the Imaginary Network […] and from that, a superego has emerged through emergence […] the Enemy]. At this point, the IN’s integration gives rise to a single higher-order entity. Yet neither society nor those “in the know” (e.g., governments, the facility) possess a clear understanding of what has emerged. The collective is recognized as an overwhelming force, but what it actually is remains unknown.

The novel’s discussion of the “hermit” presents an apparent paradox. Human individuality is described as something that takes shape through contact with others: 他者との接触をもって、人はやがて個性を獲得し、『自分』なるものが輪郭を持つ。 [Through contact with others, people eventually acquire individuality, and their sense of ‘self’ takes shape.] The hermit represents the extreme opposite of this process, conceptually excluding society and existing as a self-contained individual. That idea culminates in the image of たった一つの超自我......人格を越えた神格への没入。 [A single superego… an immersion into divinity that transcends personality.] The Enemy embodies this paradox on a far greater scale: it is a “god” constituted from “everyone,” yet fundamentally alone.

In Gotthard Günther’s essay “Cybernetic Ontology and Transjunctional Operations” (2004; originally published in 1962), Günther considers subjectivity alongside self-organizing systems and the logical structures required to describe them. Drawing upon Heinz von Foerster’s principle of “order-from-noise” (i.e., the emergence of organized structure from initially disordered or noisy conditions), Günther treats it as a key to understanding self-organization and introduces “certain new logical operations which have not yet been recognized in formal logic,” which he calls “transjunctions.” Only the basic elements of his trans-classical logic are relevant here. Within this broader framework, Günther asks, “But what is an individual subject, and what is general subjectivity as the medium that connects different egos?” He distinguishes subjectivity from merely taking oneself as an object, arguing that finite subjects “cannot reflect themselves in their true nature as subjects” and instead “only reflect objects,” such that attempts at self-reflection become distorted by treating the self in terms of objectivity (see pp. 19–20). What matters here, then, is the distinction between complexity or consciousness and the reflexive structure through which a subject comes to constitute itself.

The Enemy provides a useful case for this distinction. Despite its extraordinary informational complexity and organizational capacity, the Enemy’s total integration leaves it without a sufficiently differentiated standpoint from which to distinguish itself reflexively. Its self-reference remains enclosed within the system that constitutes it, rather than developing into an awareness of itself as a subject. The Enemy can therefore possess an immense degree of consciousness without yet possessing the reflexive structure necessary for a genuinely differentiated “I.”

Implications for Humanity

For humans connected to the IN, the consequences become apparent in the phenomenon of the FREAKs. Initially, the novel characterizes the condition as 自我拡大症 [ego expansion disorder], which Chidori explicitly distinguishes from ordinary 自我肥大 [ego hypertrophy] (i.e., an overexpansion or pathological exaggeration of the ego; Perrotta & Eleuteri, 2025). Later, the phenomenon becomes known as 同期性自我拡大症候群 [Synchronous Ego Expansion Syndrome], as similar cases begin occurring simultaneously across otherwise unrelated individuals. The affected individuals eventually come to be known as FREAKs: people whose “normal” humanity has been disrupted, although their individual abilities and knowledge can remain extraordinarily intact. Jung provides a useful description of one aspect of this condition, namely, ego inflation, in which the ego becomes identified with contents of the collective psyche that exceed the limits of individual personality, producing an inflated sense of identity and diminishing the capacity for self-criticism (1966). More fundamentally, the [ego expansion] phenomenon disrupts the self-organizing process through which individual consciousness maintains a differentiated standpoint.

Onishi’s account most clearly shows how this disruption occurs. Minami identifies the FREAKs as 「彼らによって変えられた人々のなれの果て」 [the end result of people who have been changed by them], while Onishi recalls that 「アレは媒介なしに私の意識に触れた」 [That thing touched my consciousness without any intermediary.] During the conversation, Onishi recalls reaching what he believed were principles underlying consciousness and qualia (i.e., the introspectively accessible phenomenal aspects of mental life; Tye, 2025). He then describes “something” finding those principles: 「何物かが、それを見つけた […] 私の意識から、クオリアに関する全ての知識と思考が剥奪されたのだ」 [Something found it […] All knowledge and thoughts about qualia were stripped from my consciousness.] Onishi nevertheless retains the feeling—even though the knowledge itself has been removed—that he had once reached the answer. Crucially, the experience did not simply erase his consciousness. Something within his consciousness remains intact enough for him to recognize that a loss had occurred. What the FREAK phenomenon reveals, in turn, is an alteration in the internal organization of consciousness, changing the relations through which its contents are organized without destroying the system itself.

Kadokura offers a more visible example of the same disruption. His fixation on honor, restoration, and the Sengoku era becomes increasingly detached from the reflective personality that once gave those concerns meaning. From a Jungian perspective, he increasingly identifies with the Hero archetype. Rather than simply pursuing his ideals, he comes to embody an image of the warrior and restorer through which his sense of self is defined. Itsuki explicitly describes Kadokura as having tried to become 「古い時代の体現者」 [an embodiment of the old era.] His words are described as utterances from his past, reproduced without consideration of their meanings: 言葉同士の意味も、考えられてはいない。無作為に抽出されてくるだけのものだ [The meanings of the words themselves haven’t been considered. They are simply selected randomly.] This is then identified as 拡大症に陥った者の、特徴的な言動の一つである。 [One of the characteristic behaviors of those who have fallen into ego expansion disorder.] Yet his swordsmanship surpasses its previous limits, showing that his abilities can persist even though the meanings and reflective processes that once organized them have become detached.

The mechanism behind this synchronization remains opaque to those who encounter it. Onishi later confirms that 「フリークスは同時に発生してきた」 [the FREAKs have emerged simultaneously], describing their numbers increasing from one person to two, four, sixteen, 256, and 65,536, with each subsequent number being the square of the previous one. The pattern thus appears to follow the structure of the network itself rather than arising independently within each affected individual.

Beyond the condition of the individuals themselves, the consequences extend to society as a whole. フリークス——— 異常性だけを自律機能に残した、廃人群 […] 虚人たちの群れが、人間社会の終幕となる […] 心のない社会。交換のない社会。 [Freaks—a group of broken people whose only remaining autonomous function is abnormality […] A horde of illusory beings marks the end of human society […] A heartless society. A society without exchange.] The loss of exchange follows from the disruption of the differentiated standpoint through which individual consciousness organizes itself. When the relations organizing a consciousness are severed or distorted, its contents and abilities may remain (as seen with Kadokura), while the subject that once related to them becomes increasingly fragmented. At the social level, the same disruption undermines the distinction between subjects through which meaningful exchange can take place. The result is a society composed of consciousnesses that retain information, abilities, and recognizable traces of personality while lacking the differentiated subjectivity required to relate to one another as distinct subjects.

Hegel and Self-consciousness

In G. W. F. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (1977; originally published in 1807), consciousness develops through a series of forms (i.e., successive shapes or stages such as sense-certainty, perception, and understanding; see A.I–III), through which it progressively comes to understand itself and its relation to the world. Here, I’m mainly interested in Hegel’s movement from consciousness to self-consciousness, where the question is no longer simply how consciousness relates to an object, but how it comes to recognize itself as an “I.” For Hegel, self-consciousness is deeply tied to its relation with another self-consciousness, arguing that “Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another” (Hegel, 1977, §178). This introduces the concept of recognition, through which the “I” comes to establish itself in relation to an Other. Self-consciousness therefore cannot be understood solely as an inward relation to itself; its development depends upon another subject capable of confronting it as an independent “I.”

At the outset, consciousness and self-consciousness are distinguished by their different relations to objects. Consciousness is directed toward something other than itself, whereas self-consciousness takes itself as its own object. Self-consciousness nevertheless immediately moves beyond this inward relation: “Self-consciousness is faced by another self-consciousness; it has come out of itself” (Hegel, 1977, §179). Encountering the Other therefore transforms self-consciousness from a purely reflexive relation into a relation between distinct subjects.

For the Enemy, Hegel introduces a problem distinct from Günther’s: whereas Günther is concerned with the reflexive constitution of the subject, Hegel is concerned with the relation to an Other through which self-consciousness emerges. The Enemy’s emergence from the unified consciousness of the IN provides the setting for this problem, since its constituent consciousnesses all belong to the same totality.

Shinobu provides the necessary contrast. After reaching the highest level of the IN—activating his “go root globalization” privileges—he arrives at the realization that 今、本当の意味で独立した自我を持つのはただ一人。 [Right now, there is only one person [in the IN] who truly possesses an independent self], identifying himself as the sole remaining independent ego. At its apex, he possesses the emergent power of billions of incorporated consciousnesses while retaining a differentiated standpoint of his own. Shinobu nonetheless arrives at the realization that 「僕」という個は、錯覚なんだな [the individual “I” is an illusion]. Yet even recognizing the “I” as an illusion presupposes a standpoint from which it can be apprehended—a sort of inversion of the Cartesian cogito.

The Other

The Enemy’s encounter with Shinobu at the start of the war brings this problem to a head. Until this point, it remains enclosed within the IN’s totalizing structure. Shinobu therefore provides what the Enemy had previously lacked, an Other irreducible to itself.

This becomes apparent when the Enemy’s attention turns toward Shinobu—and simultaneously toward humanity, as 人類に、忍に対して向けられた、それは視線であった [It was a gaze directed toward humanity, toward Shinobu.]—to which Shinobu responds: 「ようやく僕を見たな」 [You finally saw me]. The encounter closely resembles the relation Hegel describes, where “They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another” (Hegel, 1977, §184). Against Shinobu’s resistance, the Enemy can begin to acquire a sense of itself.

In the final sequence of the confrontation, the Enemy’s first encounter with otherness takes the form of suffering and loss. Shinobu’s final act is described as allowing the “ignorant god” to know that:

ヒトに芽生えた神を埋葬するに相応しい偉容。
[A grandeur befitting the burial of the god that had sprouted within humanity.]
聖なる一撃によって、無知なる神は知るのだ。
[Through a sacred strike, the ignorant god would finally understand.]
自分以外の誰かが、存在したことを。
[That someone other than itself had existed.]
慰められるに違いない。
[Surely, it would be comforted.]
孤独の神に捧ぐ物語。
[A story offered to the lonely god.]
絶無に行き着く苦痛と悲しみ、神を知り涙する者の存在を感受しながら、消えることができますよに。
[May it disappear while sensing the pain and sorrow that lead all the way to absolute nothingness, and the existence of those who came to know the god and shed tears.]
[…]
喪失は、自我をも築く。
[Loss, too, builds the self.]

Loss creates a distinction that the closed totality of the IN could not provide on its own. The Enemy can now apprehend an existence beyond itself through its absence, i.e., by recognizing that someone existed independently of itself and is now absent. The Other consequently acquires a reality of its own, while the Enemy gains a standpoint from which it can recognize that reality.

The destruction of the IN thus means more than the defeat of the Enemy. The network itself had become the material basis of the Enemy’s existence, since it emerged through the organic connection of an enormous number of human minds. Reducing humanity reduces the network, whose destruction returns its remaining consciousnesses to an individualized state. Their relation is, in a way, ouroboric: the same social connectivity that gives rise to the higher-order consciousness eventually turns back upon itself, exposing its isolation and separating its constituent individuals once again.

The epilogue makes this relationship explicit. Shinobu retrospectively abandons the designation “Enemy,” saying, 敵———いや、彼と呼ぼう、あれは敵ではないのだから [The Enemy—or rather, let us call him “he,” because he is not an enemy]. His emergence is traced to the excessive scale of human interconnection: when a mind capable of maintaining stable social relationships with roughly 150 others (i.e., Dunbar’s number) becomes organically connected to hundreds of millions, “he” awakens. The Enemy thus appears when a specifically human capacity for social connection is carried beyond the scale at which individual cognition can operate. Human sociality develops through the formation of groups and relationships, as well as through language and culture; the IN extends that tendency until the distinction between individuals becomes unstable.

The surviving humans are likewise described as having returned to a more ordinary distance from one another, with their social complexity reduced alongside the collapse of the network. Chidori’s observation, 「あなたたちは、また個に戻されたんですよ」 [You have been returned to being individuals], completes the movement from unity back to individuality. The IN dissolved individuality into a higher-order unity, and the destruction of that unity restores the differentiated subjects from which it arose.

Taken together, these points place the Enemy in an unusual position within the development of subjectivity. Günther’s distinction between complexity and self-reference explains how an enormous emergent consciousness can exist without the structure required to constitute itself as a differentiated subject. Hegel supplies the relational counterpart: self-consciousness develops through an Other capable of confronting the subject. Shinobu becomes that Other. Through recognition, separation, and ultimately loss, the Enemy encounters something beyond itself and begins to acquire the standpoint it had lacked since its emergence. Its awakening therefore occurs at the precise moment when its totalizing existence is coming apart. The “god” born from humanity finally encounters humanity as something other than itself, and in that encounter, an “I” begins to emerge.


Thank you for reading.

References

Günther, G. (2004). “Cybernetic ontology and transjunctional operations.” Vordenker. (Original work published 1962)

Hegel, G. W. F. (1977). Phenomenology of Spirit (A. V. Miller, Trans.; J. N. Findlay, Foreword and analysis of the text). Oxford University Press.

Jung, C. G. (1966). Two essays on analytical psychology (2nd ed., R. F. C. Hull, Trans.). Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1928)

Perrotta, G., & Eleuteri, S. (2025). “Perrotta Ego Hypertrophy Investigation Questionnaire (PEHI-Q)”: Development, regulation, and validation of a psychometric tool to investigate the clinical aspects of ego hypertrophy. Open Journal of Trauma, 9(1), 17–26.

Tye, M. (2025). Qualia. In E. N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (Eds.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2025 ed.). Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.

Xuse. (2015). 最果てのイマ -COMPLETE- ダウンロード版 (Saihate no Ima -COMPLETE- Download Edition) [Windows visual novel]. Xuse.